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ABSTRACT
When we perform probabilistic inferences with the Gaia Mission data, we technically
require a likelihood function, or a probability of the (raw-ish) data as a function of
stellar (astrometric and photometric) properties. Unfortunately, we aren’t (at present)
given access to the Gaia data directly; we are only given a Catalog of derived astro-
metric properties for the stars. How do we perform probabilistic inferences in this
context? The answer—implicit in many publications—is that we should look at the
Gaia Catalog as containing the parameters of a likelihood function, or a probability of
the Gaia data, conditioned on stellar properties, evaluated at the location of the data.
Concretely, my recommendation is to assume (for, say, the parallax) that the Catalog-
reported value and uncertainty are the mean and root-variance of a Gaussian function
that can stand in for the true likelihood function. This is the implicit assumption in
most Gaia literature to date; my only goal here is to make the assumption explicit.
Certain technical choices by the Mission team slightly invalidate this assumption for
DR1 (TGAS), but not seriously. Generalizing beyond Gaia, it is important to down-
stream users of any Catalog products that they deliver likelihood information about
the fundamental data; this is a challenge for the probabilistic catalogs of the future.
Keywords: astrometry — catalogs — methods: statistical — parallaxes —
proper motions — stars: distances
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1. INTRODUCTION
The age of Gaia is also (perhaps coincidentally) the age of principled probabilis-
tic inference in astrophysics. For this reason, the Gaia (Gaia Collaboration et al.
2016b) data are being used in many probabilistic inferences (for example,
Astraatmadja & Bailer-Jones 2016b; Hawkins et al. 2017; Sesar et al. 2017; Lin et al.
2018). These probabilistic inferences take many forms, and have different levels of hi-
erarchical complexity, but all of them require that there be, at base, a likelihood
function, or a probability for the Gaia data as a function of model parameters. One
confusing question investigators face is: What constitutes the Gaia data? And how
do I write a probability over it, when all I get to see is the official Catalog release,
with photometric and astrometric parameters and associated uncertainties?
There is a standard answer, but in most inferences it appears only implicitly: The
inferences presume that the Gaia Catalog entries can be used to construct a likelihood
function approximation, which is appropriate for use in inferences. In almost all work
so far, this likelihood function has been given a Gaussian form, with mean and variance
set to Catalog values (for example, this is clearly stated in the introductory remarks in
Astraatmadja & Bailer-Jones 2016a). The implicit assumptions underlying this choice
are what I am attempting to make explicit in this Note.
An investigator can take one of (at least) two attitudes towards the Gaia data:
The investigator can think of the Gaia Catalog as being the data, in which case
the assumption is that the generative process for each Gaia Catalog entry itself is
Gaussian. Or the investigator can think of the Gaia data as taking some raw form,
from which the Catalog has been derived (by, say, pipelines), in which case the Catalog
contains parameters of a Gaussian approximation to the likelihood function for those
raw data. It turns out it doesn’t matter which attitude the investigator takes; the
proposal for the Gaia likelihood function made here works in either case; the two
attitudes are identical in the limit that the Catalog contains sufficient statistics of
the raw data. Indeed, it is almost a definition of sufficient statistics that—if you have
them—you can use them to construct a good approximation to the likelihood function
for the raw data. All that said, we are going to take the latter attitude: That is, that
the Gaia data are raw data, and the Catalog is delivering statistics that can be used
to construct an approximation to the likelihood function.
One contemporary trend in astrophysics is to think about replacing rigid catalogs
with something more probabilistic, possibly representing uncertainties through a sam-
pling in catalog space (for example, Brewer et al. 2013; Portillo et al. 2017). This idea
is also informing some of the expected high-level outputs from the Gaia Mission too
(Bailer-Jones et al. 2013). These ideas are interesting and new, and connect to the age
of principled probabilistic inference in which we find ourselves. However, these ideas
also come with substantial risk: In many cases, a posterior sampling or posterior prob-
ability information does not successfully encode sufficient likelihood information to
permit downstream analyses (with, say, different priors). That is, investigators gener-
ally want—from an experiment or data source—likelihood information, not posterior
information. This is because different investigators can have very different priors,
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even qualitatively different priors; they won’t agree on anything about the data ex-
cept what new information those data bring. Also, if they want to combine N stars
in an inference, they obtain dangers of taking some prior to the Nth power if they
can’t get back to pure likelihood information. These concerns all flow from two prin-
ciples: The first is the likelihood principle, which states that new knowledge comes in
likelihood form. The second is the subjectivity of inference, or the principle that an
experiment ought to produce likelihood updates for all investigators, no matter what
their prior beliefs.
2. A LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION FOR GAIA
In the simplest possible case, imagine that we are trying to infer the true1 distance
dn to a star n given the Gaia data yn that pertain to star n, and nothing else (which
is the goal, for example, of Astraatmadja & Bailer-Jones 2016a) The inference looks
like this:
p(dn | yn) =
1
Zn
p(yn | dn) p(dn) , (1)
where p(dn | yn) is the posterior pdf for the true distance dn given the data yn, Zn is a
normalization constant, p(yn | dn) is the likelihood (or the pdf for the data given the
distance), and p(dn) is the prior pdf for the true distance. In order to perform this
inference, we need the likelihood and the prior.
Note that, in order to write down these schematic equations, we don’t need to be
perfectly specific here about what, exactly, is the data yn. It could be all the raw Gaia
data pertaining to this particular star n, or it could be the catalog entry in the Gaia
Catalog on star n. Nothing about this formalism changes with these different choices,
although there might be some implicit marginalizations over nuisance parameters in
some of these particular cases. That is, what you explicitly put in for the likelihood
function p(yn | dn) will depend on what you consider to be the data yn, but the formal
structure will be identical.
My goal here is to promote a particular choice for this likelihood function. Getting
straight to the point, in this simplest possible case,
p(yn | dn)=p(yn |̟n) (2)
̟n≡
1A.U.
dn
(3)
p(yn |̟n)=AnN(̟n | ˆ̟ n, σˆ
2
̟n
) , (4)
where ̟n is the true parallax to star n at true distance dn (implicitly ̟n is measured
in radians here), p(yn |̟n) is the likelihood as a function of true parallax (rather
than distance), An is a normalization (and units-conversion) constant, N(ξ |µ, V ) is
the Gaussian pdf for ξ given mean µ and variance V , ˆ̟ n is the (noisy) value given
for the parallax of star n in the Gaia Catalog, and σˆ̟n is the value given for the
uncertainty on that parallax. The amplitude An is not directly given in the Gaia
1 There are many possible meanings for the word “true”. In this context, we say the “true distance”
because it is not the measured distance, but rather the distance that the star truly has in somemodel.
4 david w hogg
Catalog but it turns out—because of that factor of 1/Zn in equation (1)—it isn’t
needed for parameter-estimation-like inferences. If you do find that you are doing
an inference for which the amplitude An matters—for instance some inferences that
might involve comparing certain kinds of fully marginalized likelihoods—then An can
probably be reconstructed from a goodness-of-fit statistic in the Catalog (that we
expect in Gaia DR2).
It is more stable numerically to do inferences with logarithms of probabilities. In
the log,
ln p(yn |̟n)=Qn −
1
2
[̟n − ˆ̟n]
2
σˆ2
̟n
(5)
Qn≡ ln
An√
2π σˆ2
̟n
. (6)
This choice (4) or (5) for the likelihood function is Gaussian, and presumes that
the Catalog values for the parallax and its uncertainty are accurate and represent
a likelihood maximum and width. It is the choice made in many publications (for
example, Astraatmadja & Bailer-Jones 2016a; Leistedt & Hogg 2017; Hawkins et al.
2017; Lin et al. 2018, among many others). It has the property that the likelihood
peaks when the true parallax matches the Catalog-reported parallax, and that the
function is symmetric in parallax space—not distance space—because Gaia measures
geometric parallaxes, not distances. The likelihood function is a pdf for the data,
evaluated at the data (which, for a Bayesian, are fixed; Jaynes & Bretthorst 2003),
and therefore although it is a pdf over data, it is really a function of the true parallax:
The likelihood function (4) returns the answer to the question: How probable are the
observed data, if ̟n is the true parallax of star n?
It is worth making a few technical notes related to dimensions or units: Because
the data yn and the true parallax ̟n have (in general, though not always) different
units, the unknown amplitude An will have (in general) non-trivial units. Also, you
might think that the conversion from distance dn to parallax ̟n in equation (2) would
bring in some Jacobian factors of the form ||ddn/d̟n||. However, because the true
distance only parameterizes a function of the data, or because the likelihood function
has units of per-data (and not per-parallax), the change of parameters doesn’t bring
a change of units, at least not in the likelihood function (it would bring a change
of units in the posterior pdf, or the prior pdf). I say more about these units issues
elsewhere (Hogg 2012).
In a more general inference, it is not just the parallax (or distance) that the inves-
tigator is modifying, but the (say) D = 5 astrometric quantities (celestial positions,
proper motions, and parallax) or a non-trivial subset of D < 5 of these. In this case
the likelihood becomes
p(yn |Xn)=AnN(Xn | Xˆn, CˆXn) , (7)
where now Xn is a D-vector of true values for the astrometric quantities for star
n, p(yn |Xn) is the likelihood as a function of that vector of true quantities, An is
a likelihood for gaia 5
again a normalization (and units-conversion) constant,N(ξ |µ, V ) is now the Gaussian
function for D-vector ξ given D-vector mean µ and D ×D covariance matrix V , Xˆn
is the D-vector of values given for the D astrometric quantities for star n in the
Gaia Catalog, and CˆXn is the value given for the D ×D covariance matrix for that
D-vector. Again, the assumption here is that the likelihood function has Gaussian
form, peaked when the true values match the Catalog values, and symmetric in the
quantities reported in the Catalog (which are celestial positions, proper motions, and
parallaxes). In the log, this is
ln p(yn |Xn)=Qn −
1
2
[Xn − Xˆn]
T · Cˆ−1
Xn
· [Xn − Xˆn] (8)
Qn≡ ln
An√
||2π CˆXn||
, (9)
where we have implicitly assumed that the D-vectors are column vectors.
One comment to make briefly here is that although the Gaia Catalog contains the
covariance matrices Cˆn, those matrices are not in the data in a trivial form. They
must be constructed from the Catalog entries. Read the manual for details.
What about transformations of the astrometric quantities? If the Gaia likelihood
is Gausssian in the Catalog values of celestial position, parallax, and proper motion,
is it also Gaussian in other functions of those variables? The answer is that it is only
Gaussian in strictly linear transformations of these parameters. It isn’t Gaussian,
therefore, in distance (which is inverse parallax), nor is it Gaussian in velocity (which
is proper motion over parallax). That is, the likelihood function in equation (4) has
a Gaussian form when plotted against parallax, but it doesn’t when plotted against
distance. That said, The proper-motion likelihood will be Gaussian in any celestial
coordinate system you prefer (equatorial or ecliptic or Galactic, for example), because
these transformations (coordinate changes) are simply rotations, which themselves
are linear transformations. Of course, if you transform the D-vector Xˆn by a linear
operator R to make a new vector R · Xˆn, you must also transform the covariance
matrix to the new matrix R · CˆXn · R
T.
The likelihood functions of (4) and (7) are probabilities of the observed Gaia
data as a function of astrometric parameters. But there are many more parameters,
including photometric, point-spread-function, and spacecraft-attitude parameters as
well, all of which contribute to the probability for the data. How do we deal with
these nuisance parameters, or how can we ignore them? Implicitly, I am assuming here
that the Gaia Catalog team has either optimized or marginalized out these nuisance
parameters. Since the GaiaMission delivers immense signal-to-noise on these nuisance
parameters in most cases (Holl et al. 2012), it won’t matter much, technically, to this
discussion whether they optimize the nuisance parameters or marginalize them out.
Of course, most inferences are not as simple as the inference described by equa-
tion (1). Except in rare cases, we aren’t just trying to find out the distance to a
single star! We usually are trying to fit some model of the Galaxy, or of some set
of stars, or calibrate a color-luminosity relationship, or something like that (for ex-
ample, Sesar et al. 2017; Hawkins et al. 2017; Leistedt & Hogg 2017; Oh et al. 2017;
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Delgado et al. 2018; Widmark & Monari 2017; Anderson et al. 2017, and many oth-
ers). In these cases, there is a model p(Xn | θ) that says what we expect for star n’s
true astrometric quantites Xn, given a set of parameters θ of our larger model. Within
that larger model, the likelihood for a single star becomes
p(yn | θ)=
∫
p(yn |Xn) p(Xn | θ) dXn , (10)
where we have marginalized out the true astrometric properties Xn for star n. These
marginalized likelihoods p(yn | θ) can be multiplied together (or, better, added in the
log) to make likelihoods for collections of stars. None of that hierarchical structure or
marginalization changes the story here, which is that the internal likelihood p(yn |Xn)
should be given the Gaussian form in equation (7).
Related to this, sometimes a model very specifically determines the astrometric
properties (celestial position, parallax, and proper motions) of the star or a subset
of those. Sometimes a model only determines distributions over those parameters.
If the model is deterministic in this sense, then the investigator can take the D-
slice (the subset of D) of the five astrometric parameters in the Gaia Catalog that
are determined, and the D × D sub-part of the 5 × 5 covariance matrix and use
that in the likelihood form given in equation (7). An example of this is given by
Astraatmadja & Bailer-Jones (2016a). If the model is not deterministic, but rather
produces distributions over some set of parameters, then the investigator will have to
do integrals like that shown in equation (10). An example of this is given by Oh et al.
(2017).
Finally, you might want to do inference not purely on the astrometric properties
(celestial position, parallax, and proper motion) but also on photometric properties
(magnitudes, colors, reddenings). In this Note, I don’t take a position on the best
likelihood function approximations for these other observables, but in general my
recommendations would be similar: Use the Catalog entries to construct a Gaussian
function to stand in for the likelihood function. In general, the magnitudes will have
uncertainties that are closest to Gaussian in flux space (not magnitude space) but I
expect that the photometric information from the Mission is so precise that it won’t
matter that much what you assume here for most kinds of stars.
3. DISCUSSION
In order to perform inferences with the Gaia data, we need a likelihood function.
The main point of this Note is that a sensible likelihood function stand-in or surrogate
can be constructed from the Gaia Catalog, under the assumption that the Catalog
contains likelihood information, and accurate (and sufficient) statistics of the data.
I give explicit forms for the likelihood function surrogate in equations (4) and (7).
These likelihood functional forms are not new—as I have emphasized, they are used
in multiple places in the literature (for example, Astraatmadja & Bailer-Jones 2016a;
Leistedt & Hogg 2017; Oh et al. 2017; Delgado et al. 2018)—the point of this is to
make the likelihood function assumptions explicit.
One of my soap-box issues is that inference is technically subjective. The investi-
gator must make decisions about what constitutes the data, and details of the model
a likelihood for gaia 7
that generates those data, in order to make inferences about the world. In this case,
I am recommending making certain decisions. The first and most important is to
decide that the likelihood function has a Gaussian form, with mean and width set
by Gaia Catalog entries. That is, assuming that the data are generated from the
world by some mechanism that is fundamentally Gaussian in the true parameters.
I am also implicitly making another recommendation, but it is a bit more subtle: I
am recommending making the assumption that the Gaia Catalog contains nearly-
sufficient statistics about the raw data, and that the likelihood function constructed
here is some kind of approximation for a probability for the raw data from the Mission
(which we currently don’t get to see). Another equally valid attitude to take is that
the Gaia Catalog is the Gaia data, and then this is just an assumption about how
the world (which is, apparently, full of true values for stellar positions and velocities;
oh and a DPAC) generated the Gaia Catalog. It is worthy of note and comment here
that although I take the former view, there is no change to anything we do if we take
the latter view. That is, this is a purely philosophical position.
Now, in detail, what have we really assumed about the Gaia data? That is, what
assumptions would make the Gaussian form accurate? There are a host of things to
say here, so I will only say a few of the most important things. The first is that
we are assuming that the Gaia team is delivering accurate results. We are assuming
that the Catalog is accurate, in terms of parameter measurements and associated
error variances and covariances. Second, we have also assumed that the Catalog is
a representation of likelihood information. That is, the Gaia DPAC has optimized
a likelihood, or something very much like that. Thirdly, we have assumed that the
likelihood is close to Gaussian in form. The likelihood will be exactly Gaussian when
the raw data are connected to the model by Gaussian noise, and the model is linear.
These requirements, amazingly, are close to being met in the Gaia global solution. But
for central-limit-theorem-like reasons, any likelihood will become close to Gaussian
when the data are good enough. So we are assuming something jointly about the
simplicity of the model and the data constraining it.
The second assumption—that the Catalog is a representation of likelihood
information—is in fact violated in detail by Gaia DR1 TGAS. This catalog is a set
of posterior inferences, one per star (Michalik et al. 2015; Gaia Collaboration et al.
2016a). However, the posterior inference for the Gaia data was made using a prior
built from the Tycho likelihood outputs (with effectively very broad or nearly flat
priors), so the TGAS Catalog can be seen as providing (nearly) pure likelihood infor-
mation, but for the combined Gaia+Tycho data. In principle, any user of the TGAS
Catalog should build a likelihood function that is a ratio of the posterior Gaussian to
the prior (or a difference of logs)! But this is a detail in the context of the very weakly
informative priors used in the construction of the TGAS data set. The weak priors
mean that the posterior pdf shape is very similar to (or perhaps identical to) the like-
lihood function shape for these data (that is, the combined Gaia+Tycho data). This
gets more challenging in the future, because the Gaia Collaboration will probably
have to use more informative priors in the future for many Catalog entries.
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Another assumption we have made is that we can treat each star indpendently.
That is, we can write down a likelihood for star n without considering any other star
n′. This assumption actually comprises two qualitatively different assumptions. The
first is that the inference of the Gaia attitude model (and other nuisances) induces
no covariances between stars. This is not true in detail, but becomes more true as the
Mission proceeds (Holl et al. 2012). The second is that the raw data can be separated
cleanly between star n and star n′. This isn’t true for stars that overlap consistently
on the focal plane; that is, for stars that are closer than a few tenths of an arcsecond.
These close pairs (or K-tuples) of stars will remain covariant in the Catalog, no matter
how much data are taken. For now we are ignoring all of these effects, because for
most stars and projects these are probably small effects, and the Catalogs themselves
ignore them anyway.
There are other sources of non-Gaussianity: There are cosmic rays and there is
binary (and triple) contamination and stellar blending and crowding and so on; won’t
these induce non-Gaussianities? They will, probably, and there are empirical hints
in the data of such issues. However, Gaussianity is the standard assumption across
Gaia science at present (see, for example, all the previous citations for uses of a Gaia
likelihood function), and it is the only sensible assumption in a context in which we
are given nothing more than a mean value and a variance around that.
On that note: One thing I like to say about Gaussianity is that if you are given
a mean and a variance for a distribution, and you believe those statistics to be ac-
curate, then the Gaussian is the most conservative assumption one can make. It is
the maximum-entropy distribution with that mean and variance! Of course this point
is something of a red herring, because it is precisely when the noise is non-Gaussian
that it will be impossible to obtain an accurate estimate of the mean and variance!
The point here is that the Gaussianity assumption in this work is strongly connected
to the assumption that the Gaia Catalog is delivering accurate statistics of the data.
I have listed many assumptions here; it is worthy of note that most assumptions
can be tested. Testing assumptions about the likelihood function can be challenging,
but there are classes of objects, like quasars, and co-moving binary stars, and Solar-
System objects, that have very predictable astrometric properties, or properties that
are highly constrained by external physical considerations. These objects can be used
to test likelihood-function assumptions.
Right now, with the simple 5-parameter solutions for stars (that is, descriptions
in terms of just a celestial position, parallax, and proper motion), it is possible to do
likelihood optimization straightforwardly because the model is close to linear. Once
the space opens up to binary companions, exoplanets, and hierarchical systems, there
will be no straightforward way to optimize the likelihood, even for a singleGaia source,
and the likelihood function will become (in general) multi-modal and non-Gaussian.
The Gaia DPAC will have to face two issues: One is how to explore the full space
or distribution of parameters that is consistent with the data. The other is how to
represent and deliver that information to the user so that it is usable in inferences.
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Even now, some of the post-processing of Gaia TGAS data to deliver improved
distance and parallax estimates are producing not likelihood outputs but rather pos-
terior outputs (for example, Astraatmadja & Bailer-Jones 2016b; Leistedt & Hogg
2017; Anderson et al. 2017). In order for these outputs to be usable in downstream in-
ferences, they have to be convertable back into likelihood (or marginalized-likelihood)
form. It isn’t sufficient to say “the prior of the next experiment will be the poste-
rior of the previous experiment” because the down-stream user might have extremely
different goals, or highly informative external data. In either case, that user needs
likelihood information from the Mission. When the Gaia DPAC starts doing binary-
star astrometric orbit inferences, the likelihood functions will become complex and
multi-modal in the orbit-parameter space, and they will be faced with challenging
questions about how to represent this information back to the user properly. Many
choices here are either very computationally expensive, very complex, or limited in
support (in the mathematical sense).
Finally, I want to end by answering the age-old question: Why does the Gaia
Catalog contain negative parallaxes? The answer, in the context of these remarks, is
that the Catalog is a description of the likelihood function, and for some stars, the
peak of the Gaussian likelihood function happens to be at a negative parallax! In
general, if a model is something like a linear fit in the presence of Gaussian noise
(and the Gaia astrometric solution is something like this), then at low signal-to-noise
the model will produce (at the maximum of its likelihood function) negative linear
coefficients just as readily as positive coefficients. That is, linear fitting in a likelihood
context will always produce negative model parameters. If the Catalog produced
posterior information, rather than likelihood information, these negative parallaxes
might get cut off by a prior. But for our purposes, this would be bad! We want the
Catalog to translate into a simple description of the likelihood function so we can do
simple inferences. Those requirements put us in a world in which Gaia reports many
negative parallaxes.
Thank you, Gaia Mission, Gaia DPAC, and Gaia Collaboration.
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